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Abstract
This paper analyzes an exchange rate policy game between a central bank and ratíonal
speculators under symmetric information. The central bank tries to counteract shocks to the
exchange rate by means of sterilized intervention working through the expectations channel.
Private speculators resist to be fooled. They anticipate the interventions. An 'intervention bias'
results with an inefficiently high equilibrium volume of intervention which does not reduce the
impact of shocks to the exchange rate. Cross-country evidence lends support to the propositions
derived from the model that the more independent the central bank the smaller and the more
consistent the intervention efforts.
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1. Introduction
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early
seventies, the exchange value of the major currencies in the industrialized world is in principle
determined by market forces. However, in the present system of managed floating [he exchange
rate is not the outcome of supply and detnand by private market participants only. The monetary
authorities of many countries have frequently been trying to influence the relative value of their
currencies by means of exchange market interventions. To comply with Article IV of the Articles
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as amended in 1978 central banks are
uhliged to promote a stable exchange rate system and hence to "counter disorderly exchange
market conditiunx". It is a fact of observatiun [ha[ central banks do indeed enler the utarket tiir
fureign exchange in case uf strains.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the motives and constraints facing central banks
when they decide to engage in foreign exchange intervention. Tu intluence exchange rate
movements interventions basically have to alter the balance of supply and demand for foreign
exchange. However, average central bank transactions in foreign exchange are very small
compared to the daily turnover on the world foreign exchange market. Furthermore, the monetary
authorities of must large countries give priority to domestic policy objectives. They routinely
neutralize the money market effect of their transactions in foreign exchange. Due to the steriliz-
ation of the money market effect the interventions, in essence, involve nothing but a shift in the
currency composition of private investment portfolios. Henderson and Sampson (1983) set out
how sterilized interventions eventually exert an effect on the exchange rate through the portfolio
balance channel by causing an imbalance in investors' portfolios. Bhattacharya and Weller (1992,
p.41 note that "it is implausible to suppose that the impact of such tiny changes in the worldwide
asset mix would have a signiticant effect on exchange rates".' According to them, the intnxlucti-
on of strategic behaviour by central banks can alter Ihe scope for intervention dramatically. This
paper explores the strategic interaction between the central bank on the one hand and private
speculators on the other hand.
The paper is organized into four rernaining sections. In section 2 central bank intervention
is modeled as a game against rational speculators. The following argument is developed. Typical
intervention efforts are very tiny compared to the average daily turnover in the foreign exchange
market. In order to maximize the effect of interventions carried out to counteract shocks to the
'Almekindcn and Eij(linger (199I) and Edison (1993) provide a comprchensivc survcy of cmpirical
investigations imo the effectiveness of intervention. They conclude that, in general, interventions working
ihrough the ponfolio balance channel have no economically significant impact on exchange rates. For a
di(ferent vicw sec Domingucz and Frankel (1993a,b). The estimation resul[s in thc latter studies are subject
to simultaneity bias andlor involve testing the effectiveness of intervcntion indin. ~ctly through a risk
prcmium.2
demand for fureign exchange, cen[ral banks will engage in surprise-interventions. Actual higher-
than-expec[ed central hank interventions may ca[ch private foreign exchange traders off balancc
Icading them to revise their tirrecasts uf future exchange ra[es. In thc ef7icient foroign exchange
market this will Iead to an immedia[e correc[ion of [he exchange rate. However, speculators resist
tu bc fooleJ hy the central bank. Conseyuently, they hase trading in the foreign exchange market
on the anticipation of central bank intervention. It is shown in the paper that the strategic
interaction between the central bank and private speculators introduces an 'intervention bias': the
equilibrium volume of intervention is ceterrs paribus larger in absolute value without reducing the
impact of shocks to the exchange rate. This is the case if the central bank systematically tries to
counteract realized shocks to the exchange rate and if the private sector has fullinformation about
the shape of the policy loss function which underlies the intervention behavior of the central bank.
Section 3 investigates the sensitivity of the equilibrium volume of intervention to changes in the
central bank's aversion to non-fundamental exchange rate changes. Furthennore, [wo propositions
arc derived with regard to the link between central hank independence and the magnitude and
vari;thility of the vulumc of intervention. Section 4 investigates whether these propositions are
supported by cross-country evidence. Section 5 concludes.
2. Central bank intervention as a game against rational speculators.
By now, an extensive body of literature exists which analyses monetary policy games (for
surveys, see e.R. Blackburn and Christensen (19R9) and Cukierman (1992)). A game theoretic
analysis uf the incen[ives facing monetary authorities when managing thc ex[ernal rather than the
internal value of the domestic currency has only recently attracted attention. Horn and Persson
(1988), Holden (1991), Alogoskoufis (1993) and Rasmussen (1993) go beyond refining the
familiar inflation-unempluyment tradeoff. HalJen (1991, p. 1543) recugnizcs that "... a govcrn-
ment may feel tempted to exploit the short run rigidity of wages, and devalue in order to obtain a
short run gain in tenns of improved competitiveness". However, for countries which committed
themselves to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) competitive
devaluations do not seem to be a feasible policy option.Z In general, the monetary authorities of
large industrialized countries give priority to domestic policy objectives. The instruments of
monetary po)icy are basically used to attain these objectives. Therefore, throughout this paper it is
assumed that central banks only try to influence the course of the exchange rate by means of
sterilized interventions which by definition lack a money market effect.
A systematic analysis of exchange rale policy reyuires an appr~,priate moctel uf thc
'Principle A o( the Principlcs and Procedures lor Survcillance which camc into effect in March 1978
provides that 'a member shall avoid manipulating exchange ra[es (...) in order to (...) gain an unfair
competitive advamage over other members' (!MF Survey, April 3, 1978).3
exchange rate. Furthermore, some assumptions regarding the behaviour of the central bank and
private exchange market participants need to be made.
The errlcaage rate
The general failure of structural models of the exchange rate in empirical tests is well
Jocumented (for a survcy see MacDonald and Taylor (1992)). In recent years many economists
have adopted new research strategies in exploring the tield of exchange rate economics. Within a
shon time an extensive literature has developed which aims to describe the mere statistical
properties of the time series of exchange rates. In this literature short-term exchange rate returns
are thought of as resultiug from the inleraclion among the various sor[s of exchange market
participants and their reaction to the 'news' which hits the market almost continuously. However,
all uf this is mostly left unspecified ('black box'). In this paper the popular random walk nuxlel of
the exchange rate is amended to allow for an effect of intervention. ~
Consider the following stochastic exchange rate equation:
~ s, - re t ó`' !NV t b' (lNV, - lNV,`) f r,. E, - N(n. a~z) (t)
where s, is the log of the foreign exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign
currency).' lNV, and INV,` denote the actual volume of intervention (purchases of foreign
currency by the domestic central bank) and private exchange market participants' expected volume
of intervention, respectively. It is important to note that speculators determine INV,`' upon
observation of e„ the stochastic shock to the exchange rate." When the actual and expected
volume of intervention are both zero (i.e., in case lNV, - INV,` - 0) and when the stochastic
shock to the exchange rate e, takes on a value of zero, the domestic currency experiences a
constant a per cent depreciation (a ~ 0) or appreciation (a c 0) vis-à-vis the foreign currency
per time period. In the remainder of the paper this a per cent exchange rate change is assumed to
hc implicd by a diffcrcncc hctwccn thc inFlationary hiases of mnncrary policy in Ihc donustic and
the fureign country.` Obviuusly, if' a is positive (negative) the domestic intlatiunary bias is higher
'Following the empirical litcrature (see, e.g. Meese and Singleton (19k2) and Baillie and Bollerslev
11989)), the exchange rate is assumed to contain a unit root.
'The shock to the exchange rate may exhibit persistencc according to r, - r„ t b t x„ whcrc x, is a
normally distributed random variable with mean uro and variance azz and b, lhe drift of the r-process, is
thc constant and predictable pan of the shock. In the present paper the exact specif`ication of the shock is not
im)x~rtant as speculators are supposed to form expectations afrer its realization.
`Similar munetary policy gamcs at home and abroad may lead [o dif7erent optimal time-consistem
inllation ratcs fur thc domestic and foreign economy. In monctary policy games productivity is usually
assumcd to bc constant and thc samc across countrics. By contra5l, thc respcrosivcncss of oulput to changcs4
(lower) than the foreign one.
Compared to individual private currency dealers, the central bank may be viewed as a
relatively big player in the market. However, intervention volumes are very tiny compared to the
total daily turnover on the foreign exchange market." Consequently, the course of the exchange
rate is not likely to be affected by the very volume of intervention. In spite of that, equation (l)
does allow steriliud interventions to affect the exchange rate through the portfolio balance
channel.' This effect is measured by the ccefficient ó~. If ó`" is positive the volume of intervention
itself matters with purchases (sales) of foreign currency affecting the exchange rate positively
(negativcly). "fhe ncgligibility ol' intervention volwnes compareJ [o thc average daily turnover on
the tiireign exchange market implies that à~ - Q Equation (I) also leaves open the possibility that
central bank intervention wurks through the expectations channel. Actual higher-than-expected
intcrventions may catch private speculators off balance and, hence, lead to a correction in the
exchange rate. The expectations channel is operative if ó" 1 D. This implies that actual larger-
than-expected purchases (sales) of foreign currency affect the exchange rate positively (nega-
tively)."
in thc rcal wage, thc differencc belween the markct clcaring level of output and its socially optimal Icvcl
andiur monnary awhoritics' prcferences may Ix; differcm in any pair ol cuimtrics (scc, e.g. Cukicrm:m
199?, p. 29). Purchasing powcr pariry (PPP) implics that thc ratc of exchangc-ratc dcprcciation is cyual to
the differencc bctween the domestic and foreign rate of inflation, ír, and x; , respectively:
"Wh:u slands nut Irom Domingucr and Frankcl (1993, Figures 5.1 and 5.4 - 5.13) is that thc
Bundcsh:mk, thc Fcdcral Rcscrvc and thc Swiss National Bank rcfrain from intcrvcning on thc majority ol
trading days. More importantly, typical intervention efforts by Ihese central banks are of Ihe order of ~I(N)
to á300 million. In April 1992, the daily average of global spot markct turnover net of double-counting
arising from Ixith local and cross-border interbank operations was estimated to bc á 400 billion. This implics
a IS percent risc from the corresponding estimate of ~350 billion for April 1989 (Bank for International
Scttlcments, 1993).
'Henderson and Sampson (1983) and Pilbeam (199I) set out how intervention operations that, for
examplc, increase the current rclative supply of German mark to U.S. dollar asscts which privatc ínvcstors
are oblíged to accept into their portfolios, (orce a decreasc in the pricc of Gcrman mark assets.
"It can easily be sccn from cquation (I) that the effcYa of (unexpectcd) purchases o( forcign currency
may not be large enough to ju!!y compensate Ibr the downward pressurc on thc czchangc rate, i.r. when
0- b" 1NV, t ót pNV, - INV,') ~ ~a ~ c,~ . In that case, casual observation of the resulting exchangc
ratc movement, t1 s,, Ieads one to conclude that thc intcrvcn[ions were not cl'fcctivc. This touches upon thc
familiar me[hcxlological problcm that, in practice, the rate of apprcciation u t e, that would havc cxcurrcd
in thc absencc of intcrvcntion is not known.5
Centra! bank óehaviour
The central bank is assumed to make a tradeoff between the costs of interventions in the
spot market for foreign exchange and the losses from fluctuations in the exchange rate. The
central bank policy loss function looks as follows:
- ~(c fNV~z t ~ (0 s, - a)~ (2)
The first term on [he right hand side of (2) proxies the costs of intervention. The value of the
central bank loss function increases more than proportionally with the volume of intervention. The
higher the volume of intervention the higher the potential financial Iosses on [he net fureign
currency position of the central bank caused by purchases (sales) of foreign currency which turn
out to be not successful at preventing the domestic currency from appreciating (depreciating). Of
course, potential financial gains from interventions which turn out to be effective also increase
with the volume of intervention. However, if central banks are risk averse and if they are aware
of the relative negligibility of interventions on the balance of supply and demand in the foreign
exchange market, they will limit the chance of losing money by intervening too heavilyy It seems
that, the more predictable the actions of the central bank the higher ceteris paribus the potential
losses from intervention and the higher the cost coefficient c.
In principle, exchange rate stability is a public good. The second term on the right hand
side of (2) reflects that central bank losses increase more than proportionally with changes in the
exchange rate which are not caused by the differential inflationary biases a[ home and abroad.
Above it was argued that the different outcomes of the monetary policy games between the central
bank and workers in Ihe domestic and the foreign economy initially resulted in an a per cent per
period depreciation of the domestic currency (of course, when a is negative the domestic currency
appreciates). This depreciation may be at odds with for instance the monetary authorities' attempts
to stabilize the exchange rate and to maintain external eyuilibrium of the domestic economy.
However, it is assumed that the central bank gives priority to domestic monetary policy and that it
will not direct exchange rate policy at counteracting exchange rate movements which are a direct
result of the outcome of the monetary policy game.
Ratiottal speculators
The foreign exchange market is hit by 'news' almost continuously. This frequent arrival of
new information causes currency traders' positions to be in a permanent state of flux. Each
vApan from financial costs of intervention, it can be argued that there are reputational costs involved as
well. The latter costs will not be analyzed in the present paper, however.6
exchange market participant bases position taking on his prediction of the market's interpretation
of, and reaction to news and rumors. This translates into a stochastic shock to the exchange rate
e,. Obviously, this stochas[ic shock is the outcome of a kind of infortnation game among well-
informed private exchange market participants (Lyons (1991)). However, for the present exchange
rate policy game issues of intra-private sector behaviour, addressed in Blackburn and Christensen
(19R9, p. 12) in a general game theoretic context, are of no concern.
By assumption, strategic interaction between the central battk on the one hand and private
exchange market participants on the other hand comes into play only after the shock e, has
materialized.'o Consequently, for the exchange rate policy game, the diverse group of foreign
currency traders can be treated as one representative agent. The loss function of the representative
speculator looks as follows:
Lfrs - ~ (INV,` - INV,)1 (3)
where INV,` denotes the speculator's expectation regarding the volume of intervention to be carried
out by the central bank in period t. To make sure, the realization of the shock e, is contained in
the information set of the representative speculator when he computes this expectation. The loss
function in (3) reflects speculators' aversion to be fooled by the central bank.
7ite Nash equilibrium of the exchange ratepolicy game
The strategic in[eraction between the central bank and the representative speculators takes
place after the shock to the exchange rate has occurred. Hence, although there is a stochastic
element in the exchange rate model, the exchange rate policy game is deterministic. Upon the
observation of the speculative shock to the exchange rate, the monetary authorities attempt to
minimize period t's policy loss, taking the expectations of private exchange market participants,
INV,`, as given (the Nash assumption). The central bank's reaction function to the expectations of
other exchange market participants is obtained from the first order condition for a minimum of
(2), i.e. BL,`~"~dlNV,-O, after substituting equation (1) into it:
lNV - o` (S~ tSF~ [SE INV,` - e J c1 }a(ar tSF)Z ~ (4)
"'In Krugman's (1991) target zone model the anticipation of unlimited ur~srerilized interventions by thc
central bank at the edges of the band induces an S-shaped ezchange ratc paltern inside the band, thc so-
called honeymoon effect. Thcre is no such effec[ in [he model here. This is because the central bank is
assumed to use monetary policy instruments only for domestic policy objectives. This assumption, which
secros realistic for most large industrialized countries, diminishes the scope for central bank intervention
rather dramatically. Private speculators know that interventions have no significant impact on the exchange
rate as long as they do not come by surprise. Hence the absence of a honeymoon-effect.7
According to equation (4) the domestic central bank partly accomodates private exchange tnarket
participants' expectations regarding the volume of intervention." Clearly, private exchange
market participants minimize period t's losses by setting
lNV,` - lNV, (5)
An expression for equilibrium intervention is obtained by substituting this reaction function in (4):




Figure 1 shows [he central bank's reaction function for the case of a negative shock to the
domestic-currency value of foreign currency, i.e. E, G 0.'Z Thus it depicts the volume of
intervention as a function of the expected volume of interven[ion in a situation in which purchases
of foreign currency are called for. The only point at which expectations are rational is at point N,
the intersection of the central bank's reaction function and the 45"-line through the origin. This
represents the Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium which is also called the 'discretionary equi-
librium' or the 'time consistent solution' in the 'rules versus discretion' literature is unique in this
one-shot game. If private exchange market participants expected a lower volume of intervention,
in absolute terms, than what is implied by (6), the central bank would have an incentive to carry
out surprise interventions. Thus, expectations would not turn out to be rationaL" Intervention
expectations rise to the point where there are no further incentives for the central bank to create
surprise interventions. Analogous to the well known 'inflationary bias' of discretionary monetary
policy analysed by Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and Alogoskoutis (1994) this is the 'intervention
bias' of discretionary exchange ra[e policy. The volume of intervention at point N is given by
equation (tí). However, what stands out from equation (5) and Figure I is that in equilibrium
intervention is fully anticipated. Substituting (5) in the exchange rate equation ( 1) gives
ds~-afó~INV,fE, (7)
„ aóF(ó~{ óE) is smaller than one as long as c1 ~- a ó~ (b~ t óE). This holds by assumption.
c1 ta (ó~ tbE)z
''This figure is based on a similar one in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 597).
"At points to the left (right) of N, the private sector chooses INV,' and the central bank responds by
actually carrying out lNV, such that INV, ~ INV,' (lNV, c INV,~.s
Equations (6) and (7) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal intervention policy. The
intervention policy of the central bank described by equation (4) is time-consistent in the sense
[hat at each point in time the volume of intervention selected is best, given the current situation.
However, as can be seen from equation (6) and (7), the resulting policy is sub-optimaL It is sub-
optímal since it produces an intervention bias with no gains in the form of systematically smaller
exchange rate changes unless the portfolio balance channel is operative, i.e unless S~ ~ 0.
3. The sensitivity of intervention policy to changes in the preferrnces of the central bank
This section investigates the effect of changes in the weight assigned by the central bank to
limiting Fluctuations in the exchange rate around the purchasing puwer parity-implied fundamental
trendline. Throughout the paper it is assumed that the monetary authorities of the domestic
country give priority to domestic policy objectives. Monetary policy, i.e. the choice of domestic
inflation is used to attain these objectives. A basic assumption in monetary policy games is that
due to existing distortions the market-clearing level of output is lower than the monetary
authorities' target level. The parameter which denotes the relative weight the central bank places
on output compared to inflation is of crucial importance in the monetary policy game. A well-
known result in the literature on monetary policy games is that the higher the central bank's
weight on output, the greater the incentive to create surprise inflation. In many studies the
parameter for the central bank's weight on output is interpreted as the inverse of the degree of
central bank independence (Rogoff (1985), Eijffinger and Schaling (1993b), Debelle (1993)). The
idea behind this is that a central bank knows that in the long run it can not systematically stimulate
output by means of surprise intlation. Consequently, a central bank will only engage in larger-
than-expected monetary expansions if it is forced to do so by politicians and if it is not protected
from their inFluence by law.
In the previous section it was established that the central bank is not able to systematically
limit the impact of realized shocks to the exchange rate by means of interventions which work
through the expectations channel. Consequently, a central bank which is independent from
political incumbents will in general not stubbornly resist these shocks to the exchange rate. As
shown by for instance Cukierman (1992) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993a) in most countries
central banks are highly dependent on the goverrunent in general and the minister of fittattce in
particular. As a result, the policies implemented by central banks are not independent from the
general political process. For instance, a persistent appreciation of the domestic currency will lead
domestic exporters to complain to the minister of finance about their declining competitiveness on
the world market. A central bank which lacks autonomy in the field of exchange rate policy may
be forced by the ministry of finattce to engage in highly visible foreign exchange intervention;
political incumbents will want to show that they are really concerned with the competitiveness of
domestic exporters. The converse of this argument is as follows. The greater the independence9
given to the central bank by law, the smaller the political influence on exchange rate policy and
the smaller the pressure on [he central bank to systematically counteract speculative shocks to the
exchange rate. Analogous to the monetary policy game, the notion of central bank independence
can be incorporated in the present exchange rate policy game by taking the weight a in the central
bank loss function in (2) to measure the inverse of the independence of the central bank.
Regarding the intervention reaction coefficient in (6) it can be shown that a B ia a~ 0
at~d az B I a az c 0. Consequently, the higher the weight given by the central bank to
reducing changes in the exchange rate which are larger in absolute value than those implied by
purchasing power parity, i.e. the higher the value of a, the larger the intervention bias. From this
proposition 1 can be derived.
Proposition 1: The more independent the central bank, the smaller [he average
volume of intervention
From
!im B - !im
a(St'Sv) - ~ (8)
~. m ~-m C1 taóv(av,de) óv
it follows that when the central bank is averse to non-fundamental exchange rate changes thc
interventiun reaction coefficient in (5) converges to the inverse of the coefficient which measures
the "volume effect" of intervention. It can be shown that this is the same intervention reaction
coefficient as in the game against nature in which SF - 0. Figure 2 shows how the intervention
reaction coefficient in (5) changes with an increasing aversion of the central bank to speculative
shocks to the exchange rate. When a goes to infinity the central bank (or the politicians which
determine its policy) is not bothered by the costs of intervention. In a full information exchange
rate policy game private speculators know the value of a. Consequently, when a is very high they
know that the central bank is going to counteract realized shocks to the exchange rate (e,) as
fiercely as possible. As a result, the expectations channel of influence of interventions does not
work at all. The mere "volume effect" of intervention has to do the job. This implies that the
central bank will have to try to affect the exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel of
intervention. Clearly, when Sv is very small the average volume of intervention goes to infinity.
[Insert Figure 2]
The variability of the volume of intervention is also sensitive to changes in the central
bank's aversion to non-fundamental changes in the exchange rate. Taking variances of (5) gives
Var (INV~) Ia? - BZ. From
Var INV,) z a(óFt v) Z !
lim ( - !im B - !im a -
~ m Q~ ~. m ~ m c1 taóvBv,be) (Sv)a
(9)lo
it follows that, if the central bank gives an infinite weight to stabilizing the exchange rate around
PPP-levels, the variance of the volume of intervention is positively related to the variance of
shocks to the exchange rate, a,~, and inversely related to the effectiveness of interventions via the
portfolio balance channel. Obviously, aBZ ~a a 10. This implies that a higher weight to limiting
changes in the exchange rate leads to a higher variance of the volume of intervention relative to
the variance of the shock to the exchange rate. From this proposition 2 can be derived.
Proposition 2: The more independent the central bank, the lower the variance of
the volume of intervention.
Equating to zero the second derivative of BZ with respect to ~ obtains a point of inflection a[ ~-
c~~(2 á~(á~ t óE)). Figure 3 shows how the relative variability of the intervention volume changes
with an increasing aversion of the central bank to speculative shocks. From equation (5) it follows
that the higher the costs of intervention, c, the smaller ceteris paribus the equilibrium volume of
intervention. When the weight a increases, the central bank is relatively less concerned with the
costs uf intervention. This leads to a catch-up effect with the variability of intervention (compared
to n,~) initially rising fast. When a is above the value corresponding to the point of inflection the
shape of the central bank loss function in (2) implies that the costs of intervention start to weigh
more heavily again. Consequently, a rise in ~ leads to a slower rise in the relative variability of
the volume of intervention.
[Insert Figure 3]
4. The link between intervention efforts and central bank independence: some cross~ountry
evidence
Section 2 presented a simple game-theoretic model of exchange rate policy. In section 3 it
was establishetl that the model implies a negative correlation between the degree of central bank
independence and the magnitude and variability of the volume of intervention. ln this section it
will be investigated whether these negative correlations are supported by cross-country evidence.
The Eijffinger-Schaling (ES) index of policy independence developed in Eijffinger and Schaling
(1993a) will be used as a measure of central bank independence." This index is available for
"Eijffinger and Schaling (I993a) showed that the Alesina (1988, 1989) synthetic indicator o( central
bank independence is intemalty inconsistent and does not qualify as an index. Grilli, Masciandaro and
Tabellini (GMT) (1991) developed an index of potitical and economic independence which is very broad.
Because they use eight criteria in determining the degrce of independence, the essential chazacteristics of
central bank independence are watered down. Alesina and Summers (1993) averaged the Alesina index and
the GMT index of political and economic independence.II
twelve major industrialized countries. For each of the twelve central banks the tnagnitude of the
intervention efforts is proxied by the average absolute percentage change in the foreign exchange
reserves of the respective central bank. The variability of the volume of intervention is proxied by
the variance of the absolute monthly percentage change in the central bank's foreign exchange re-
serves.'s The data on central bank independence and intervention efforts are depicted in Table 1.
The relationship between the degree of central bank independence and [he magnitude and
variability of the volume of intervention is analyzed for the post-Bretton Woods period from
February 1973 through to January 1993. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
all countries were fully committed to maintaining a fixed price of the U.S. dollar in terms of their
own currency. In the model in section 2 it was assumed that central banks are free to choose the
actual volume of intervention, i.e. they are not bound by international exchange rate arrange-
ments. Therefore, the propositions derived from this model can not be tested with data covering a
period duríng which central banks were obliged to conduct unsterilized interventions in case of
strains on the foreign exchange market.
Figure 4 shows a negative relation between the average absolute percentage change in
foreign exchange reserves and the ES index of central bank independence. Switserland is a clear
outlier in the figure. There are two obvious explanations fot that. Firstly, Switserland plays a
central role in international banking. Moreover, international investors often regard it as a safe
heaven. Consequently, foreign currency flows into the Swiss economy can at time be very large.
The Swiss National Bank, like many other central banks, sometimes tries to limit the upward
pressure on the external value of the Swiss frame by absorbing some of the foreign currency
coming in from abroad. Secondly, it is an idiosyncracy of Swiss commercial banks that they wish
to exhibit higher end-of-quarter liquidity in terms of Swiss francs than they wish to maintain over
the entire period. In order to smooth out the resulting daily money market rate peaks, the Swiss
National Bank offers end-of-quarter swaps to commercial banks (Gártner (1987, p. 443)). These
swaps are completely unrelated to developments in the foreign exchanges. Yet, they are included
in the monthly reserves data used in this section.
'SThe data are taken from the Intemational Financial Statistics of the IMF, Foreign rxchartge reserves èn
mi(lions oj U.S. do!lars, line I D.D. Upon denoting this monthly variable by R„ the average monthly
absolute percentage change in the foreign exchange reserves of country i is given by
i~s i
DRes; 1 ~ (~R,-R,-~~)!R,-,
- 240 r.ivn:z
The variance of the monthly absolute percentage change in foreign exchange reserves of country i is given
by
,~:i
VarRes; - ~Var(~R,-R,.,~IR,.~)~ - I ~ ((~R,-R,.~~IR,-~) - DRes,~z
240 , - isn:z12
With Switserland excluded from the sample, the negative correlation between the volume
of intervention and the degree of central bank independence is supported by the results of a simple
OLS regression depicted in the top row of Table 2.
The negative relation between the variability of the volume of intervention and the degree
of central bank independence can be seen from Figure 5. The result of an OLS regression shown
in the bottom row of Table 2 confirtn this (again Switserland is left out of the sample).
5. Conclusions
This paper investigates the motives and constraints facing central banks when they decide
to engage in foreign exchange intervention. It analyzes an exchange rate policy game between a
central bank and rational speculators under symmetric infotmation. The central bank systematical-
ly tries to counteract realized shocks to the exchange rate by means of sterilized interventions
which presumably work through the expectations channel. Private speculators resist to be fooled.
They anticipate the interventions. As a result an 'intervention bias' emerges with the equilibrium
volume of intervention ceteris paribus being larger in absolute value without reducing the impact
of shocks to the exchange rate. The equilibrium volume of intervention is sensitive to changes in
the central bank's aversion to non-fundamental exchange rate changes. The paper argues that the
greater the independence given to the central bank by law, the smaller the political intluence on
exchange rate policy and the smaller the pressure on the central bank to systematically counteract
speculative shocks to the exchange rate. Analogous to the monetary policy game, the notion of
central bank independence is incorporated in the exchange rate policy game by taking the central
bank's aversion to non-fundamental exchange rate changes to measure the inverse of the indepen-
dence of the central bank. In section 3 it is established that the simple game-theoretic model of
exchange rate policy implies a negative correlation between the degree of central bank indepen-
dence and the magnitude and variability of the volume of intervention.
For the post-Bretton Woods period from February 1973 through to January 1993 a cross
section of twelve industrialized countries lends support to the propositions derived from the model
that the more independent the central bank the smaller and the more consistent the intervention
efforts.13
References
Alesina, A., "Macrceconomics and Politics", In NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1988, edited by S.
Fischer, pp. 17-52. Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1988.
Alesina, A., "Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies", Economic Policy, Spring
1989, 8: 58-98.
Alesina, A., and L.H. Summers, "Central Bank Independence and Macrceconomic Performance:
Some Comparative Evidence", lournal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 1993, 25:
151-162.
Almekinders, G.J., and S.C.W. Eijffinger, "Empirical Evidence on Foreign Exchange Market
Intervention: Where Do We Stand?", Weltwirtschafr[iches Archiv, 1991, 127: 645-677.
Alogoskoufis, G., "On Inflation, Employment and the Optimal Exchange Rate Regime", in: F.
van der Plceg (ed.), Handbook ofInternationalMacroeconomics, Oxford 1994.
Baillie, R.T., and T. Bollerslev, "The Message in Daily Exchange Rates: A Conditional Variance
Tale", Journalof Business á Economic Statistics, 1989, 31: 297-305.
Bank for International Settlements, Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange Market Activity in
Apri! 1992 , Monetary and Economic Department, Basle, March 1993.
Barro, R. and D. Gordon, (1983a) "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary
Policy", Journalof Monetary Economics, 1983, 12:101-122.
Barro, R. and D. Gordon, (1983b) "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate
Model", Journa[of PoliticalEconomics, 1983, 91: 589-610.
Bhattacharya, U. and P. Weller, The Advantage to Hiding One's Hand: Speculation and Central
bank lntervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, Centre For Economic Policy Re-
search, Discussion Paper, No. 737, November 1992.
Blackburn, K. and M. Christensen: "Monetary Policy and Credibility: Theories and Evidence",
Journal of Economic Literature, 1989, 27: 1-45.
Blanchard, O. and S. Fischer, Lectures on Macroeconomics, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 1989.
Cukierman, A, Central Bank Strategy, Credibiliry and Independence, Cambridge Mass: MIT
Press, 1992.
Debelle, G., "Central Bank ~ndependence: A Free Lunch?", Working paper, MIT, October 1993.
Dominguez, K.M. and J.A. Frankel (1993a) Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Work?, Insti-
tute for International Economics, Washington, DC, September 1993.
Dominguez, K.M. and J.A. Frankel (1993b) "Does Foreign-Exchange Intervention Matter? The
portfolio Effect", American Economic Review, December 1993, 83: 1356-1369.
Edison, H., "The Effectiveness of Ceraral Bank Intervention: A Survey of the Literature after
1982", Special Papers in International Economics, Princeton University, Princeton NJ,
No. l8, July 1993.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. and E. Schaling (1993a) "Central Bank Independence in Twelve Ittdustrialta
Countries", Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, March 1993, No. 184: 1-41.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. and E. Schaling (1993b) "Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence",
CentER Discussion Paper No.9325, May 1993.
Gánner, M., "Intervention policy under tloating exchange rates: an analysis of the Swiss case",
Economica, November 1987, 54, 439-453.
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, "Political and Monetary Institutions and Public
Finance Policies in the Industrial Countries", Economic Policy, October 1991, 13: 341-92.
Henderson, D.W. and S. Sampson: "[ntervention in Foreign Exchange Markets: A Sutnmary of
Ten Staff Studies", Federal Reserve Bulletin, November 1983, 69: 830-836.
Holden, S., "Exchange rate policy and wage formation in an economy with many trade unions",
European Economic Review, 1991, 35: 1543-1557.
Horn, H. and T. Persson, "Exchange rate policy, wage formation and credibility", European Eco
nomic Review, 1988, 32: 1621-1636.
Krugman, P., "Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics", Quarterly Journal oj Econo-
rnics,l991, 106: 669-82.
Lyons, R., Private be[iefs and information externalities in the foreign exchange market, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, nr. 3889, 1991.
Meese, R.A. and K.1. Singleton, "On Unit Roots and the Empirical Modeling of Exchange
Rates", Journal of Finance, September 1982, 37: 1029-35.
MacDonald, R. and M.P. Taylor, "Exchange Rate Economics: A Survey", StaJjPapers, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Mazch 1992, 39: I-57.
Pilbeam, K.: Exchange Rate Management: 7heory and Evidence, Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1991.
Rasmussen, B.S., "Exchange rate policy, union wage indexation attd credibility", Journa[of Inter
nationalEconomics, 1993, 35: 151-167.
Rogoff, K., "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intetmediate Monetary Target", Quarter
ly Journal of Economics, 1985, 100: 1169-90.lNV~
a (ó~ t óE)





Figure 1 Actual and expected intervention in the presence of positive shocks to the demand
for domestic currency which the domestic central bank wants to counteract.B ( - INV~ l
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Figure 3 The central bank's aversion to shocks to the exchange rate and the
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Change in Forex Reserves
ES-index, DRes; VarRes;
Australia l 6.80 63.27
Canada I 11.69 194.91
France 2 4.53 27.31
Italy 2 9.37 133.16
Sweden 2 6.65 49.25
United Kingdom 2 4.75 44.96
Belgium 3 5.56 38.99
Japan 3 2.77 13.13
United States 3 5.77 42.76
The Netherlands 4 4.74 26.42
Germany 5 3.39 20.13
Switurland 5 8.54 62.67
Table 2 Central Bank lndependence and the magnitude and variaóility of intervention:
OLS estimation results: Febtvary 1973-lanuary 1993."
independent variable
de ndent variable constant ES-index.
DRes; 9.59 -1.41 0.37
6.37 -2.62
VarRes, 129.82 -27.63 0.30
(3.84) (-2.29)
'"For the United States the sample pcriod chosen covers the period November 1978 through to January
1993. Immediately after the demise of the Bretton Woods system the published foreign exchango reserves of
the U.S. were very small. Under those circutnstances, small absolu[e changes in the reserves are eqttivalent
to very large percentage changes.
"Ttte number of observation is eleven. T-statistics are in parentheses. R2 is the squared multiple
correlation coefficient adjusted for degrees of freedom.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
(For previous papers please consult previous discussion papers.)
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